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Abstract 
 
The delay-based fingerprint embedding was recently proposed to support more users in secure media 
distribution scenario. In this embedding scheme, some users are assigned the same fingerprint code with 
only different embedding delay. The algorithm's robustness against collusion attacks is investigated. 
However, its robustness against common desynchronization attacks, e.g., cropping and time shifting, is 
not considered. In this paper, desynchronization attacks are used to break the delay-based fingerprint 
embedding algorithm. To improve the robustness, two means are proposed to keep the embedded fin-
gerprint codes synchronized, i.e., adding a synchronization fingerprint and adopting the relative delay to 
detect users. Analyses and experiments are given to show the improvements. 
 
Index Terms—digital fingerprinting, audio watermarking, collusion attack, desynchronization attack, 
collusion resistance, secure multimedia distribution 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
With the development of multimedia technology and network technology, multimedia distribution be-
comes more and more popular. In some applications, such as video-on-demand, broadcasting and IPTV, 
some authorized users may redistribute their media copy to other unauthorized users, which cause 
profit-losses to service providers. As a solution, digital fingerprinting [1] was recently reported, which 
embeds users’ identification information into media content imperceptibly and produces different cop-
ies for different users. The identification information that is often named fingerprint code can be used to 
trace illegal users. 
  However, fingerprinting techniques face a big threat named collusion attack [1]. In collusion attack, 
several users combine their copies together to generate a new copy without fingerprint codes. The com-
bination operation may be averaging, min-max selection, linear combination, etc. To resist collusion 
attacks, some means have been proposed to generate fingerprint codes, which can be classified into two 
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types, i.e., orthogonal fingerprint and combinatorial code. In orthogonal fingerprint [2][3][4], the fin-
gerprint code is the sequence independent from each other. For example, the fingerprint code can be a 
bounded Gaussian (BG), pseudo-noise (PN) or orthogonal Hadamard Walsh codes, and different fin-
gerprint code corresponds to different user. In combinatorial code, fingerprint codes are carefully de-
signed by combinatorial codeword [1,5,6], which can detect the colluders partially or completely. The 
combinatorial codes have the following property: each group of colluders’ fingerprint produces unique 
codeword that determines all the colluders in the group. The codeword is constructed based on combi-
natorial theory, such as AND-ACC (anti-collusion codes) or BIBD [7]. 
  According to the existing fingerprint schemes, different user has a different fingerprint code. Thus, for 
the scheme supporting N users, N fingerprint codes should be generated and stored. To reduce the time 
and space cost, the delay-based fingerprint embedding scheme [8] is recently reported. In this scheme, 
the users are classified into groups, and the users in the same group have the same fingerprint code, 
with only the embedding delay different. Thus, the number of fingerprint codes can be reduced greatly. 
The scheme's robustness against collusion attacks has been analyzed and confirmed. However, the ro-
bustness against such desynchronization attacks as cropping and time shifting has not been considered, 
which restricts its application greatly.   
  In this paper, the delay-based fingerprint embedding scheme's robustness against desynchronization 
attack is analyzed and tested. Based on the analyses, some means are presented to improve the scheme's 
robustness. And the improvements will be shown by the experiments. The rest of the paper is arranged 
as follows. In Section 2, the delay-based fingerprint embedding scheme is introduced. The desynchroni-
zation attacks are used to break the delay-based embedding scheme in Section 3. In Section 4, some 
means are presented to improve the scheme's robustness, and the experiments are shown in Section 5. 
Finally, some conclusions are drawn and future work is given in Section 6. 
 
2. THE DELAY-BASED FINGERPRINT EMBEDDING SCHEME 
 
In traditional fingerprinting algorithms [1], each user is assigned a different fingerprint code. Thus, for 
N users, N fingerprint codes should be generated and stored. In the delay-based fingerprint embedding 
scheme [8], as shown in Fig. 1, N users are partitioned into M groups, each of which is composed of P 
(N=MP) users. For the P users in the same group, i.e., i-th (i=0,1,…,M-1) group , they have the same 
fingerprint code Fi but different embedding delay dj (j=0,1,…,P-1). Thus, the number of fingerprint 
codes is reduced from N to M. 
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Fig. 1. The delay-based embedding model 
 
  Generally, the fingerprint code is embedded into media content repeatedly in order to improve the 
robustness against common signal processing. Set X=x0x1…xn-1 the original content segment, α the em-
bedding strength, and Yt=yt,0yt,1…yt,n-1 the t-th user's fingerprinted content segment. For the t-th 
(t=0,1,…,N-1) user, his fingerprint code is Fi=wi,0wi,1…wi,n-1 ( /i t P=    , and /t P    is the maximal integer 
no bigger than t/P), and embedding delay is dj (j=t mod P, and mod is module operation). Taking addi-
tive embedding for example, the t-th embedding is defined as 
, ,| | ( 0,1, , 1)j j jt k d k d k d i ky x x w k nα− − −= + = −" .                                                                  (1) 
  The correlation based detection is used to detect the existence of the fingerprint codes Fi and the 
corresponding delays dj, see [8] for detail. It has been show that the delay-based algorithm saves some 
cost for fingerprint embedding/detection, and it is robust against some collusion attacks. However, the 
robustness against such desynchronization attack as cropping or time shifting is not confirmed, which 
will be discussed as follows. 
 
3. ATTACK ON THE DELAY-BASED SCHEME 
 
3.1 Desynchronization Attacks 
 
Desynchronization attacks are often used to break watermarking systems, which change the water-
marked media's position in spatial domain or temporal domain in order to make the watermark unde-
tectable. Taking audio watermarking for example, the typical desynchronization attacks include crop-
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ping, time shifting, etc. As shown in Fig. 2, cropping is to cut off a block from the watermarked audio, 
while time shifting is to change the time position of audio content.  
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Fig. 2. Examples of cropping and time shifting 
 
3.2 Desynchronization Attack without Collusion 
 
The desynchronization attacks can be applied to the watermarked audio content when there are no col-
lusion attacks. Taking the audio content contains the t-th user's fingerprint code Fi and the correspond-
ing embedding delay dj for example, as shown in Fig. 3, the cropping or time shifting attacks can easily 
change the delay. Here, after cropping or shifting the watermarked audio content, the fingerprint's posi-
tion is moved from dj to dj' or dj".   
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Fig. 3. Desynchronization attacks without collusion 
 
  Taking the case of dj' for example, the attacked audio content Yt'=yt',0yt',1…yt',n-1 satisfies 
, ,| | ( 0,1, , 1)j j jt k d k d k d i ky x x w k nα′ ′ ′′ − − −= + = −" .                                                                           (2) 
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Thus, after detecting the fingerprint code Fi and the delay dj', the user t' can be determined, which satis-
fies 
t i P j′ ′= ⋅ + .                                                                                                                                   (3) 
Then, the detected user is t'. Since j j′ ≠ , then t t′ ≠ . Thus, after desynchronization attacks, it is diffi-
cult to detect the user correctly. 
 
3.3 Desynchronization Attack after Collusion 
 
After collusion attacks, desynchronization attacks can be fatherly used to change the watermarked audio 
content. As shown in Fig. 4, for two colluders, t0 and t1, their fingerprint codes are Fi0 and Fi1, and their 
embedding delays are dj0 and dj1, respectively. After cropping or time shifting, the fingerprint codes' 
positions may be changed from dj0, dj1 to dj'0, dj'1 or dj"0, dj"1. 
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Fig. 4. Desynchronization attacks after collusion 
 
  Taking the case, in which, the embedding delays are dj'0 and dj'1, for example, the attacked audio 
contents Yt'0=yt'0,0yt'0,1…yt'0,n-1 and Yt'1=yt'1,0yt'1,1…yt'1,n-1 satisfy 
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Here, k=0,1,…,n-1. Thus, after detecting the fingerprint codes, Fi0 and Fi1, and the delays, dj'0 and dj'1, 
the colluders, t'0 and t'1, can be determined by 
0 0 0
1 1 1
t i P j
t i P j
 ′ ′= ⋅ +
′ ′= ⋅ +
.                                                                                                                                  (5) 
Since 0 0j j′ ≠  and 1 1j j′ ≠ , then 0 0t t′ ≠  and 1 1t t′ ≠ . Thus, after desynchronization attacks, the colluders 
can not be detected correctly. 
 
4. MEANS TO IMPROVE THE DELAY-BASED FINGERPRINT EMBEDDING SCHEME 
 
According to the analyses presented in Section 3, the delay-based fingerprint embedding scheme is not 
robust against desynchronization attack. Here, two means are proposed to improve the scheme's robust-
ness: i) add an additional synchronization fingerprint, and ii) detect the fingerprint with comparative 
delay. The fingerprint codes and the corresponding delays are shown in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5. The improved delay-based embedding model 
 
In the improved scheme, for the t-th user, the synchronization fingerprint S=s0s1…sn-1 are embedded 
into the media content besides the fingerprint Fi. Here, S is orthogonal to Fi. The embedding process is 
defined as 
, ,| | | |Sj j jt k d k d k d i k kk dy x x w x sα α− − − −= + + .                                                                           (6) 
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Here, k=0,1,…,n-1, dS is the embedding delay of the synchronization fingerprint, and other parameters 
are similar to the ones defined in Eq. (1). The delay dS can be randomly selected, but it keeps the same 
for different customer. 
The correlation based detection is used to detect the position of synchronization fingerprint, dS, the 
existence of the fingerprint codes Fi and the corresponding delays dj. If no desynchronization attacks 
exist, then, the t-th user can be detected by 
t i P j= ⋅ + .                                                                                                                                       (7) 
And the colluders are determined by dj-dS. 
If desynchronization attacks exist, the improved scheme uses the comparative delays to remove the 
effect caused by desynchronization attacks. Taking the desynchronization attacks without collusion for 
example, after attacks, the detected delay of S is dS', and the detected delay of Fi is dj'. Then, the original 
dj can be computed by 
( )s sj jd d d d
′
′
= − − .                                                                                                                     (8) 
And then, the t-th user can be correctly detected according to Eq. (7). Under the condition of desyn-
chronization attacks with collusion, the similar result can be induced. 
 
5. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
 
Taking the popular music Casblk1.wav sampled at 44.1KHz for example, the robustness of the original 
delay-based scheme and the improved scheme are compared. Here, P=4, M=16, N=64, n=1024, 
0.05α = , dj+1-dj=20, and dS is randomly generated. For simplicity, the synchronization fingerprint S and 
the fingerprint code Fi are generated by pseudo-noise [8] with the maximal amplitude of 1. In the de-
synchronization attacks, each segment composed of 1024 pixels is cropped or time-shifted in the range 
of [1,512]. Under the condition of desynchronization without collusion, 100 copies are generated for the 
original scheme and the improved scheme, respectively. In the 100 copies, there are 50 cropped copies 
and 50 shifted copies. The correct detection rate is computed for different schemes, which denotes the 
ratio between the number of correctly-detected copies and the total number of copies. For the original 
scheme, the correct detection rate is no more than 25%, while, for the improved scheme, the correct 
detection rate is 100%. Under the condition of desynchronization with collusion, the average-colluded 
copies are cropped or shifted, and 100 copies are also produced. The comparison between the original 
scheme and the improved scheme is shown in Fig. 6. Seen from it, the improved scheme gets higher 
correct detection rate than the original scheme, and obtains the similar result with the case without de-
synchronization attack. It shows that the improved scheme is much more robust against desynchroniza-
tion attacks than the original scheme. 
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The improved scheme's robustness against some other attacks is similar to the original scheme. The 
original scheme's robustness has been analyzed and evaluated in [8][9]. In the improved scheme, two 
fingerprint codes are embedded into each media copy. Compared with the original scheme, the im-
proved one causes some quality degradation. However, it has been shown in [9] that the degradation is 
imperceptible when the number of embedded fingerprint codes is no more than 4. Thus, in the improved 
scheme, the fingerprint codes are still imperceptible. 
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Fig. 6. The robustness against desynchronization attack 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this paper, the robustness of the delay-based fingerprint embedding scheme is analyzed and improved. 
Firstly, desynchronization attacks, including cropping and time shifting, are used to break the delay-
based fingerprint scheme. It is shown that the colluders can easily escape from the detection if the fin-
gerprinted media is desynchronized. Following the attacks, an improved scheme is proposed, which 
adds a synchronization fingerprint and adopts the comparative embedding delay to trace colluders. 
Analyses and experiments show that the improved scheme obtains much higher robustness compared 
with the original scheme, while its other performances keep nearly unchanged. In future work, the 
scheme's robustness against some other attacks will be investigated, and the fingerprint code with better 
robustness will be evaluated. 
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